Incentive-Based Voltage Regulation in Distribution Networks

Emiliano Dall-Anese, Kyri Baker, Xinyang Zhou, Lijun Chen

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

9 Scopus Citations


This paper considers distribution networks featuring distributed energy resources, and designs an incentive-based algorithm that allows the network operator and the end-customers to pursue given operational and economic objectives, while concurrently ensuring that voltages are within prescribed limits. This social-welfare maximization problem is challenging due to the non-convexity. We first reformulate the problem as a convex task together with an incentive signal design strategy, and then propose a distributed algorithm for solving the reformulated problem. By doing so, we are able to achieve the solution of the original non-convex problem without exposure of any private information between end-customers and network operator. Stability of the proposed schemes is analytically established and numerically corroborated.

Original languageAmerican English
Number of pages7
StatePublished - 29 Jun 2017
Event2017 American Control Conference, ACC 2017 - Seattle, United States
Duration: 24 May 201726 May 2017


Conference2017 American Control Conference, ACC 2017
Country/TerritoryUnited States

Bibliographical note

See NREL/CP-5D00-69115 for preprint

NREL Publication Number

  • NREL/CP-5D00-69115


  • distribution networks
  • real-time pricing
  • social welfare maximization
  • Voltage regulation


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