Incentive-Based Voltage Regulation in Distribution Networks: Preprint

Emiliano Dall-Anese, Kyri Baker, Xinyang Zhou, Lijun Chen

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper


This paper considers distribution networks fea- turing distributed energy resources, and designs incentive-based mechanisms that allow the network operator and end-customers to pursue given operational and economic objectives, while concurrently ensuring that voltages are within prescribed limits. Two different network-customer coordination mechanisms that require different amounts of information shared between the network operator and end-customers are developed to identify a solution of a well-defined social-welfare maximization prob- lem. Notably, the signals broadcast by the network operator assume the connotation of prices/incentives that induce the end- customers to adjust the generated/consumed powers in order to avoid the violation of the voltage constraints. Stability of the proposed schemes is analytically established and numerically corroborated.
Original languageAmerican English
Number of pages9
StatePublished - 2017
Event2017 American Control Conference - Seattle, Washington
Duration: 24 May 201726 May 2017


Conference2017 American Control Conference
CitySeattle, Washington

NREL Publication Number

  • NREL/CP-5D00-67884


  • distributed energy resources
  • distribution systems
  • optimal power flow
  • real-time pricing


Dive into the research topics of 'Incentive-Based Voltage Regulation in Distribution Networks: Preprint'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this