Abstract
In order to model the interactions among utility companies, building demands and renewable energy generators (REGs), a hybrid coalitional-noncooperative game framework has been proposed. We formulate a dynamic non-cooperative game to study the energy dispatch within multiple utility companies, while we take a coalitional perspective on REGs and buildings demands through a hedonic coalition formation game approach. In this case, building demands request different power supply from REGs, then the building demands can be organized into an ultimate coalition structure through a distributed he- donic shift algorithm. At the same time, utility companies can also obtain a stable power generation profile. In addition, the interactive progress among the utility companies and building demands which cannot be supplied by REGs is implemented by distributed game theoretic algorithms. Numerical results illustrate that the proposed hybrid coalitional-noncooperative game scheme reduces the cost of both building demands and utility companies compared with the initial scene.
Original language | American English |
---|---|
Pages | 895-899 |
Number of pages | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 26 Feb 2016 |
Event | 49th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2015 - Pacific Grove, United States Duration: 8 Nov 2015 → 11 Nov 2015 |
Conference
Conference | 49th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and Computers, ACSSC 2015 |
---|---|
Country/Territory | United States |
City | Pacific Grove |
Period | 8/11/15 → 11/11/15 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© 2015 IEEE.
NREL Publication Number
- NREL/CP-5D00-66630
Keywords
- energy response
- game theory
- Hybrid coalitional-noncooperative game
- renewable energy generators